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1.1  Introduction 
After decades of protectionist policies, most of Latin America began to open 
up to the rest of the world in the late 1980s. This process, pioneered by Chile, 
is perhaps the most impressive achievement of the structural adjustment pro- 
grams of the last decade. It has effectively put an end to more than four decades 
of generalized import substitution policies aimed at encouraging an industrial 
sector, that turned out to be largely inefficient.’ 
The process leading to these trade reforms has not been easy. As recently as 
in the mid-1980s the protectionist view was still dominant in many parts of 
Latin America. In fact, the debt crisis of  1982 provided a new impetus to the 
protectionist paradigm. Initially, many analysts interpreted the crisis as a fail- 
ure of  “the world economic order” and argued that the only way  for Latin 
America to avoid the recurrence of this type of shocks was to further isolate 
itself from the rest of the world, through selective protectionism and govern- 
ment intervention. This sentiment was compounded by the fact that a number 
of observers considered the experiences of  the Southern Cone countries-Ar- 
gentina, Chile, and Uruguay-with  liberalization reforms during the 1970s as 
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1. Even though the experiences of the individual Latin American countries varied during 1950- 
80, in the majority of them some variant of inward-looking development was the dominant policy. 
Since the early  1960s a number of trade liberalization attempts have taken place in the region. 
Almost every one of them has ended in frustration. In fact, until the late 1970s-1980s  very little 
progress was made in this area. 
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a failure. This view has been clearly synthesized by Lance Taylor (1991, 119), 
who has argued that the “trade liberalization strategy  is intellectually mori- 
bund” and that there are “no great benefits (plus some costs) in following open 
trade and capital market strategies” (141). From here he goes on to say that 
“development strategies oriented internally may be a wise choice towards the 
century’s end” (141). 
Immediately  following the eruption of  the debt crisis, it seemed that in- 
creased protectionism was indeed the path that Latin American countries had 
chosen as a possible way out of their problems. Even Chile, the strongest sup- 
porter of free trade, tripled its import tariffs.* As a result of this, in the mid- 
1980s Latin  America  had  one of  the most distorted external sectors in the 
world, with extremely high import tariffs and, in some cases, quantitative re- 
strictions that covered every single import item (see table 1.1). 
However, by 1987-88  it became increasingly apparent that a permanent so- 
lution to the region’s economic problems would require a fundamental change 
in its development  strategy. In particular, policymakers began to realize that 
the long-standing protectionist trade policy  was central to the region’s prob- 
lems. The poor performance of  the Latin American countries offered a dra- 
matic contrast to the rapidly growing East Asian countries that had  aggres- 
sively  implemented  outward-oriented  strategies.  With  the  help  of  the 
multilateral  institutions, a larger and larger number of countries began to re- 
duce their levels of protection during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  This trade 
reform process has been supplemented with broad deregulation and privatiza- 
tion, and is proceeding at an increasingly rapid pace. Tariffs have been drasti- 
cally slashed, in many cases import licenses and prohibitions have been com- 
pletely eliminated, and a number of countries are actively trying to sign free 
trade agreements with the United States. 
Latin  America’s long tradition  with protectionist  policies molded  the re- 
gion’s economic structure in a fundamental way, creating a largely inefficient 
manufacturing sector.3 Tariffs and prohibitions also generated a severe anti- 
export bias that discouraged both growth and diversification of exports4 This 
process took place through two main channels. First, tariffs and other forms of 
protection increased the cost of imported intermediate materials  and capital 
goods used in the production of exportable goods, reducing their effective rate 
of protection. Second, and perhaps more important, the maze of protectionist 
policies resulted in massive real exchange rate “overvaluation”  that reduced 
2. However, as I argued in Edwards (1988a), in many countries this increase in protectionism 
was dictated by necessity. 
3. There has long been a literature documenting the consequences of  protectionism in the Latin 
American economies. For recent studies, see the Latin American cases covered in the Michaely, 
Choski, and Papageorgiou (1991) project. 
4. In the 1960s some countries decided to implement export promotion schemes based on gov- 
ernment support and adjustable exchange rates. To  some extent this was partially successful in 
Brazil. However, as Fishlow (1991) has pointed out, this development did little to reduce Brazil’s 
vulnerability to foreign shocks. 15  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
Table 1.1  Import Protection in the Developing World, 1985 (%) 
Total Tariff Protection=  Non-tariff Barriers Coverageb 
South America  51 
Central America  66 
Caribbean  17 
North Africa  39 
Other Africa  36 
West Asia  5 








Source; Erzan et al. (1989). 
Note; The data on both tariffs and NTBs reported here are weighted averages. 
.‘Includes tariffs and paratariffs. 
bMeasures as a percentage of import lines covered by  NTBs. 
the degree of competitiveness of exports.s Paradoxically, the policies that were 
supposed to reduce Latin  America’s dependency on the worldwide business 
cycle ended up creating a highly  vulnerable economic  structure, where the 
sources of foreign exchange were concentrated on a few products intensive in 
natural resources (Fishlow 1985). 
The trade liberalization programs implemented during the last decade have 
two basic policy objectives. First, these reforms have sought to reduce the anti- 
export bias of commercial policies. It is expected that, once negative effective 
rates of protection and overvalued exchange rates are eliminated, exports will 
not only grow rapidly but will also become more diversified. 
The second fundamental objective of trade reforms is to transform interna- 
tional trade into “the engine of growth.” The new literature on “endogenous” 
growth has stressed the role of  openness in explaining cross-country growth 
differentials over the long run.h For example, Romer (1989) has argued that 
more open economics can take advantage of  larger markets, increasing their 
degree of efficiency and their rate of growth. Other authors, including Gross- 
man and Helpman (1991a, 1991  b) and Edwards (1992b), have recently argued 
that openness affects the speed and efficiency with which small countries can 
absorb technological innovations developed in the industrial world. This idea, 
based on an insight first proposed by  John Stuart Mill, implies that countries 
5.  Krueger  (1978)  documents  these  developments  for a  large  number  of  countries.  Diaz- 
Alejandro (1975, 1978) argues that real exchange rate overvaluation was one of the most negative 
economic developments in Argentina. For an analysis of  a large number of  Latin countries, see 
Bianchi (1988). For an  early discussion on the Chilean case, see Behrman (1976). Since 1967 
Colombia pursued a crawling-peg exchange rate policy explicitly aimed at avoiding overvaluation. 
The overall degree of protection, however, remained high (Garcia-Garcia 199  1). 
6. Traditional neoclassical growth models concentrated on the effect of  national economic poli- 
cies on the level of income per capita. The new generation of endogenous growth models have 
shifted attention to the relationship between different policies and the rate of growth of the econ- 
omy. See Lucas (1988). 16  Sebastian Edwards 
with a lower level of trade distortions will experience faster total factor produc- 
tivity  growth  and thus  will  grow  faster  than  countries  that  inhibit  interna- 
tional competition.’ 
The purpose of this paper is to explore, from different perspectives, the rela- 
tionship between trade liberalization and growth. The analysis deals with both 
long-mn and transitional issues.  I first concentrate  (section  1.2) on the long- 
run relation between trade regimes and productivity growth. I use a broad fifty- 
four-country  data  set to investigate  the way  in which  trade distortions  have 
affected productivity growth in the 1971-82  period. The results obtained sup- 
port the view that more open economies tend to have faster rates of productiv- 
ity growth than countries that have distorted international trade. In sections 1.3 
and 1.4, I discuss some of the most important problems faced during the transi- 
tion by  countries engaged in trade liberalization programs.  While in section 
1.3 I focus on general transitional issues at an analytical level, in section 1.4 I 
deal with the recent Latin American trade reforms. I first document the extent 
of  trade liberalization.  Second, I  investigate whether, as predicted  by  some 
authors, these reforms have been associated with faster productivity growth. In 
section  1.5  I  discuss  the recent  behavior  of  real  exchange  rates  in  Latin 
America,  emphasizing the way  in  which  they  are likely  to  affect  the sus- 
tainability of the trade reforms. Finally, in section 1.6 I present a summary of 
the paper, and I discuss some of the unresolved issues related to Latin Ameri- 
can trade policy. 
1.2  Openness and Growth: Cross-Country Evidence 
1.2.1  A Simple Model 
A number of researchers have found that factor accumulation  explains be- 
tween one-half and two-thirds of long-run growth (Fischer  1988). The large 
unexplained  residual  in growth  accounting  exercises  has been  attributed  to 
“technological progress” or “productivity gains.” From a policy perspective a 
key question is what determines these productivity improvements. In particu- 
lar, it is important to understand whether national domestic policies-includ- 
ing financial and trade policies-can  affect the pace of productivity growth. If 
this is the case, policymakers will have additional degrees of freedom to pursue 
those avenues that will enhance long-run performance. 
The recent interest on “endogenous” growth models has generated a revival 
in applied research on the determinants of growth. Some authors have empha- 
7. In chapter 17 of his Principles ofPolitical Economy (1848) Mill said that “a country that 
produces for a larger market than its own can introduce a more extended division of labor, can 
make greater use of machinery, and is more likely to make inventions and improvements in the 
process of  production.” Arthur Lewis makes a similar proposition in his  1955 classic book  on 
economic growth. See Tybout (1992) for a survey on the early empirical work in this area. 17  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
sized the role of openness in determining the pace at which countries can ab- 
sorb  technological  progress  originating  in  the  rest of  the  world.x Edwards 
(1992), for example, has recently assumed that there are two sources of total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth: (1) a purely domestic source stemming from 
local technological improvements (innovation); and (2) a foreign source related 
to the absorption  of inventions generated  in other nations  (imitation). More 
specifically, assume that the country’s ability to appropriate  world technical 
innovations (or to imitate) depends on two factors: positively on the degree of 
openness of the economy and, also positively, on the gap between the country’s 
level of TFP and “the world’s’’  stock of TFP. The first channel is the “openness 
effect” discussed by Lewis (1955): more open countries have an advantage in 
absorbing new ideas generated in the rest of  the world. In this context “more 
open” should be interpreted as refemng to a less distorted foreign trade sector. 
The second channel is a “catch-up” effect, common to growth models based 
on “convergence” notions. 
If the aggregate production function is defined as y, = Af(K,,L,),  then TFP is 
A, = yj’.),  and total productivity growth is (AIA).  The role of the two sources 
of technical  progress discussed  above-innovation  and immitation-can  be 
captured by the following simple expression: 
A  A = (Y  + [pw + ?(AT)], 
where  and y are positive parameters, A* is the level of world’s (appropriable) 
TFP, and w  is the rate of growth of world’s TFP (that is, A(* =  Aie”‘). P is a 
parameter between zero and one that measures the country’s ability to absorb 
productivity improvements originating from the rest of the world, and is as- 
sumed to be a negative function of the level of  trade distortions in the econ- 
omy (6). 
where 6 is an index of trade distortions that takes a higher value when interna- 
tional trade, both in imports and/or exports, becomes more distorted. 
Parameter a  is the basic rate of domestic productivity growth or innovation, 
which  for  simplicity  is  assumed  to  be  exogenous.  On  the  other  hand, 
(y(A* -  A)/A)  is the  “catch-up”  term that  says that  domestic  productivity 
growth will be faster in nations whose stock of knowledge lags further behind 
the world’s accumulated stock of appropriable kn~wledge.~ 
In this setting the path through time of domestic TFP will be given by“’ 
8. Grossman and Helpman (1991a)  provide a series of elegant models along these lines. 
9. I assume that not all inventions generated in the world can be freely appropriated. In that 
sense, A* could be  interpreted as the accumulated stock of  innovations in  the more advanced 
countries that have spilled over to the rest of the world. 
10. This, of course, is the solution to differential equation (1). 18  Sebastian Edwards 
(3) 
It follows from equation (3) that the long-run rate of growth of domestic TFP 
will  depend on  whether  (y -  a -  pw) 5 0.  If  (y -  a -  pw) > 0,  in  the 
steady-state TFP will grow at the rate of worlds productivity  w. This means 
that the level of domestic TFP (and of GDP) will be a function of the degree 
of trade intervention, with higher trade distortions resulting in a lower level of 
real income. A key implication of this result is that countries that engage in 
trade liberalization programs will be characterized, during the transition be- 
tween two steady states, by  higher rates of  productivity  growth and thus by 
faster rates of GDP growth. 
A  second  case  appears  when  (y -  a -  pw) < 0. Long-run  TFP growth 
(AIA)  will depend on how large the world’s rate of growth of TFP (w) is relative 
to the domestic rate of productivity  improvement. If w > (a-S)/(l  -  p), do- 
mestic TFP will grow in the steady state at the world rate w. If  w <  (a-y)/ 
(1 -  p), and  (y -  LY -  Po)  < 0, however, the long-run  equilibrium  rate  of 
TFP growth will be equal to (a  + pw -  S)ll and will depend negatively on 6, 
the country’s level of trade distortions. That is, in this case more open countries 
(those with  low 6) will grow faster during steady-state equilibrium. This is 
because in this case the domestic source of technological inventions is strong 
enough to drive, even in the steady state, the aggregate rate of technological in- 
novations.  l2 
The model developed above suggests that TFP growth will depend on the 
degree of trade distortions in the economy, and on a catch-up term that meas- 
ures the gap between the country’s and “the world’s’’ level of productivity. I 
constructed a cross-country data set to test these implications of  the model. 
More specifically, I estimated equations of the following type: 
(4)  P,  = b, + bl6,  + b2g, + Ca,  xzn + P“, 
where p,  is the average rate of growth of TFP in country n;  6,, is, as before, an 
index  of  trade  distortions; g,  is the catch-up term; the x, are other possible 
determinants of TFP growth; and JA is an error term. 
Recently,  Barro  (1991), Edwards  (1992),  and  Roubini  and  Sala-i-Martin 
(1992), among others, have suggested that, in addition to the degree of open- 
ness, productivity  growth will also be affected by  the following factors: (1) 
human capital, usually measured by schooling attainment; (2) the importance 
of government in the economy measured by schooling attainment; (2) the im- 
11. Of course, in this case, (a  + Po -  6)  >  w. 
12. In Grossman and Helpman’s (1991a) micromodel of technological progress, it is also pos- 
sible that, under some circumstances, more open economics will exhibit higher long-run growth. 19  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
portance of government in the economy measured by the ratio of government 
expenditure to GDP; (3) the degree of political instability; and (4) the inflation 
rate.13 In  the estimation of  equation (4) reported below, I have  incorporated 
these variables as possible determinants of productivity growth. 
1.2.2  Data Definitions and Sources 
TFP growth. A problem faced in the estimation of equations of the type of (4) 
refers to the measurement of TFP growth. In particular, it is difficult to obtain 
long time series of capital stocks for a large number of countries. In this paper 
I deal with this problem by  constmcting three measures of  TFP growth from 
the residuals of country-specific GDP growth regressions. These indices are 
denoted TFP1, TFT2,  and  TFP3. The  specific methodology  used  in  con- 
structing each of these indices is presented in appendix A.I4 
Trade distortions. Traditionally, studies that have investigated the relationship 
between trade policy and economic performance have had difficulties measur- 
ing the extent of trade distortions. In this paper I tackle this problem by using 
two variables. In  most of the basic estimates I  use the ratio of  total revenue 
from taxes on foreign trade-import  tariffs plus export taxes-over  total trade 
as a proxy for trade distortions. This variable is measured as an average for 
197  1-82.  Since this variable, denoted TRADETAX, measures the “true” extent 
of trade distortions with error, in the estimation of the TFP growth equation I 
also use an instrumental variable technique that tries to correct for rneasure- 
ment error. The second proxy I use is the 1971-82  average trade dependency 
ratio-imports  plus exports as a percentage of GDP. These two indices of trade 
distortions were constructed with  raw  data obtained from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Catch-up term. Following the recent literature on endogenous growth (Barro 
1991; Edwards  1992), I use  initial GDP per capita-for  year  1971 in this 
case-as  a measure of the gap between a particular country’s level of produc- 
tivity and that of the world. This variable is denoted as GDP71; the data were 
obtained from Summers and Heston (1988). The coefficient of this variable is 
expected to be negative, indicating that countries with a lower initial per capita 
GDP have more “catching up” to do and thus will grow faster. 
Human capital. I use two indices. The first one is the attainment of secondary 
education in 198  1. The second one is the increase in secondary education cov- 
erage between  1961 and  1981. When alternative indices, such as secondary 
and higher education, were used, the results obtained were not altered. The 
13. See, for example, Barro (1991). 
14. Naturally, these indices are at best proxies for TFF’  growth. formally, we can think that they 
measure TFP growth with error. To  the extent that this measurement error term is additive, it can 
be collapsed into disturbance p in equation (4). 20  Sebastian Edwards 
data were obtained  from the World Bank’s World Development Report. The 
coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive. 
Role of  government.  This index is defined as the share of  government over 
GDP and is taken from Summers and Heston (1  988). Barro (1991) has argued 
that this coefficient should be negative, capturing the effect that greater govern- 
ment activities tend, in general, to crowd out the private sector. 
Political instability. This variable is defined as the average perceived probabil- 
ity of government change and is obtained from Cukierman, Edwards, and Ta- 
bellini ( 1992).l5 Its coefficient in the TFP growth equations is expected to be 
negative,  reflecting  the fact that  in politically  unstable  situations economic 
agents do not devote their full energies to pursue economic objectives. 
Injation tax. This variable is defined as the average collection of inflation tax 
for 1971-82  and is computed as Tm,  where T  is the rate of  inflation and m is 
the ratio of MI to GDP. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be nega- 
tive, reflecting the effects of higher inflation on uncertainty and economic ac- 
tivity. 
1.2.3  Econometric Results 
Tables  1.2 and  1.3 summarize the results obtained from the estimation of 
several versions of equation (4). Table 1.2 contains weighted least squares esti- 
mates-with  population  in  1971 as weight-for  all three measures  of  TFP 
growth;lb table  1.3 presents  instrumental  variables regressions  for the TFPl 
definition of productivity growth. (When the other two indices were used, the 
results were not altered significantly.) 
As can be seen from these tables, the results are highly satisfactory. Almost 
every coefficient has the expected sign and is significant at conventional levels. 
Particularly important for the discussion pursued in this paper is that in every 
regression the proxies for trade distortions and openness are highly significant. 
Moreover, the computation of standardized beta coefficients indicate that trade 
impediments are  the  second most  important explanatory  variable  of  TFP 
growth, after the catch-up term.” 
As pointed out above, both the TRADETAX coefficient and the trade depen- 
dency ratio are imperfect proxies of trade distortions. In particular, they do not 
capture directly the role of quantitative restrictions on trade. In order to deal 
with this measurement  error problem  I estimated instrumental-variables  ver- 
15. These authors computed this index  from a probit analysis on  government change using 
16. In simple ordinary estimates, least squares heteroskedasticity was detected. Barro (191  1) 
17. In equation (4.1) the standardized beta coefficient of TRADETAX is -0.75;  that of GDWl 
pooled data for 1948-8 1. 
and Edwards (1992). among others, also used weighted least squares in equations of this type. 
is -0.78. 21  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
Table 1.2  Total Factor Productivity Growth Regressions: Cross-Country Results 
(weighted least squares) 
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TFP2  TFP2 
-0.018  -0.005 
(-1,418)  (-0.439) 
-1.8E-06  -1.lE-06 
(-2.960)  (-2.451) 
-0.074  - 
(-2.620) 
-  0.025 
(3.9 1  0) 
-6.5E-04  -4.1E-04 
(-2.292)  (- 1.433) 
5.90E-05  1.30E-04 
(0.675)  (1.560) 
-  - 
-0.026  -0.043 
(-2.846)  (-5.253) 
-  8.8E-05 
(0.487) 
0.492  0.487 
54  52 
TFP3  TFP3 
0.074  0.030 
(6.163)  (1.772) 
-3.7E-06  -1.5E-06 
( -  2.187) 
-0.199  - 
( -  3.673) 
(-4.902) 
-  0.025 
(2.480) 
(-5.157)  (-4.827) 
-  1.20E-04 
(0.895) 
-  2.OE-03  -2.OE-03 
1.60E-04  - 
(1.453) 
-0.014  -0.023 
( -  1.607)  ( -  1.802) 
-  -2.7E-05 
(-0.921) 
0.598  0.416 
52  52 
- 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. N is the number of observations; R2 is the coefficient of determination. 
See appendix B for a list of the countries considered in this regression. 
“or  exact explanations on how TFPI, TFP2, and TFP3 were constructed, see appendix A. 
sions of some of these equations. In reestimating equation (4) I used the trade 
penetration  ratio of  imports to GDP as instruments for TRADETAX.I8 The 
results obtained are presented in table 1.3. As can be seen, they confirm those 
discussed previously and provide additional support to the view that, after con- 
trolling for other factors, countries with more open and less distorted foreign 
trade sectors have tended to exhibit a faster rate of  growth of  TFP, over the 
long run, than those nations with a more distorted external sector. The results 
presented in tables 1.2 and 1.3, however, provide no information on the transi- 
tion from a closed economy to one that is more open and integrated to the rest 
of the world. I turn to those issues in sections 1.3-1.5. 
18. The instruments themselves don’t have to be measured free of  error. Of course, the use of 
instrumental variables is not the only way of dealing with measurement error. In Edwards (1992) 
I  use reversed regressions to construct intervals for a different proxy of  openness  in  standard 
growth equations for a group of thirty countries. 22  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 1.3  Total Factor Productivity Growth Regressions: Instrumental 
Variables (dependent variable TFPl) 










































Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses. N is the number of observations; RZ  is the coefficient of determi- 
nation. The following instruments were used a constant, GDP71, government, education, trade 
dependency, imports/GDP  ratio,  political  instability, and  inflation tax.  These  equations  were 
weighted by population in 1971. 
1.3  Policy Issues during a Trade Liberalization Transition 
The analysis presented in  section 1.2 provides support for the hypothesis 
that in the long run more open economies have experienced faster productivity 
growth than countries that distort international trade. However, as the former 
communist countries have recently found out, designing a strategy for moving 
from a controlled to a liberalized economy is not an easy task. 
Two  fundamental problems have  to be addressed in the transition toward 
freer trade. First, it is important to determine what is the adequate speed of 
reform. For a long time analysts argued for gradual liberalization programs 
(Little, Scitovsky, and Scott 1970; Michaely 1985). According to these authors 
gradual reforms would give firms time for restructuring their productive pro- 
cesses and thus would result in low dislocation costs in the form of unemploy- 
ment and bankruptcies. These reduced adjustment costs would, in turn, provide 
the needed political support for the liberalization program. Recently, however, 
the gradualist position has been under attack. There is increasing agreement 
that slower reforms tend to lack credibility, inhibiting firms from actually en- 
gaging in serious restructuring. Moreover, the experience of Argentina in the 
1970s has shown that a gradual (and preannounced) reform allows those firms 
negatively affected by it to (successfully) lobby against the reduction in tariffs. 
According to this line of reasoning, faster reforms are more credible and thus 
tend to be sustained through time (Stockman 1982). 23  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
The thinking on the speed of  reform has also been influenced by  recent 
empirical work on the short-run unemployment consequences of trade liberal- 
ization. Contrary to traditional conventional wisdom, a study directed by Mi- 
chaely, Choski, and Papageorgiou (1991) on liberalization episodes in nineteen 
countries strongly suggests that, even in the short run, the costs of reform can 
be  small. Although contracting  industries will  release  workers,  those  ex- 
panding sectors positively affected by the reform process will tend to create a 
large number of  employment positions. The Michaely, Choski and Papageor- 
giou study shows that in sustainable and successful reforms the net effect- 
that is, the effect that nets out contracting and expanding sectors-on  short- 
run employment has been negligible. A key question, then, is what determines 
a successful reform? Most historical studies on  the subject have  shown that 
maintaining a “competitive” real exchange rate during the transition is one of 
the most, if not the most, important determinants of successful trade reforms. 
A competitive, that is depreciated, real exchange rate encourages exports, and 
helps maintain external equilibrium at the time the reduction in tariffs has 
made imports cheaper. 
The second problem that has to be addressed when designing a liberalization 
strategy refers to the sequencing of  reform (Edwards 1984). This issue was 
first addressed in the  1980s in discussions dealing with the Southern Cone 
experiences, and emphasized the macroeconomic consequences of alternative 
sequences. It was generally agreed that resolving the fiscal imbalance and at- 
taining some degree of macroeconomic reform should constitute the first stage 
of a structural reform. On subsequent steps, most agreed that the trade liberal- 
ization reform should precede the liberalization of the capital account, and that 
financial reform should be implemented simultaneously with trade reform. 
The behavior of the real exchange rate is at the heart of this policy prescrip- 
tion. The central issue is that liberalizing the capital account would, under most 
conditions, result in large capital inflows and in an  appreciation of  the real 
exchange rate (McKinnon 1982; Edwards 1984; Harberger 1985). The prob- 
lem with an  appreciation of  the real exchange rate is that  it will send the 
“wrong” signal to  the real  sector, frustrating the reallocation of  resources 
called for by the trade reform. The effects of this real exchange rate apprecia- 
tion will be particularly serious if, as argued by  Edwards (1984), the transi- 
tional period is characterized by  “abnormally” high capital inflows, and the 
economy is characterized by high adjustment costs. If the opening of the capi- 
tal account is postponed, however, the real sector will be able to adjust, and 
the new allocation of resources will be consolidated. According to this view, 
only at this time should the capital account be liberalized. 
More recent discussions on the sequencing of  reform have  expanded the 
analysis and have included other markets. An  increasing number of  authors 
have argued that reform of the labor market-particularly  removal of distor- 
tions that discourage labor mobility-should  precede trade reform, as well as 
relaxation of  capital controls. It is even possible that liberalization of  trade 24  Sebastian Edwards 
in the presence of  highly distorted labor markets will be counterproductive, 
generating overall welfare losses in the country in question (Edwards 1992b). 
As the preceding discussion has suggested, there is little doubt that the be- 
havior of the real exchange rate is a key element during a trade liberalization 
transition. According to traditional manuals on “how to liberalize,” a large de- 
valuation should constitute the first step in a trade reform profess. Bhagwati 
(1978) and Krueger (1978) have pointed out that in the presence of quotas and 
import licenses a (real) exchange rate depreciation will reduce the rents re- 
ceived by importers, shifting relative prices in favor of export-oriented activi- 
ties and thus reducing the extent of the antiexport bias.” 
Maintaining a depreciated and competitive real exchange rate during a trade 
liberalization process is also important in order to avoid an explosion in im- 
ports growth and a balance-of-payments crisis. Under most circumstances a 
reduction in the extent of protection will tend to generate a rapid and immedi- 
ate surge in imports. On the other hand, the expansion of exports usually takes 
some time. Consequently, there is a danger that a trade liberalization reform 
will generate a large trade balance disequilibrium in the short run. This will 
not happen, however, if there is a depreciated real exchange rate that encour- 
ages exports and helps maintain imports in check. However, many countries 
have historically  failed to sustain a depreciated real exchange rate during the 
transition. This failure has mainly been the result of expansionary macroeco- 
nomic policies, and has resulted in speculation, international reserves  losses, 
and, in many cases, the reversal of the reform effort. In the conclusions to the 
massive World Bank project on trade reform, Michaely, Choski, and Papageor- 
giou  (1991) succinctly summarize the key  role of the real exchange rate in 
determining  the  success of  liberalization programs:  “The  long  term perfor- 
mance of the real exchange rate clearly differentiates ‘liberalizers’ from ‘non- 
liberalizers”’  (1  19). Edwards  (1989) used data on thirty-nine exchange rate 
crises and found that in  almost every case real exchange  rate overvaluation 
gave rise to drastic increases in the degree of protectionism. 
1.4  Recent Trade Liberalization Reforms in Latin America 
During the last few years trade liberalization reforms have swept through 
Latin America; every country in the region has today a significantly more open 
trade sector than in the early and mid-1980s. The pioneer in the liberalization 
process was Chile, which between 1975 and 1979 unilaterally eliminated quan- 
titative restrictions and reduced import tariffs to a uniform level of 10%. After 
a brief interlude with higher tariffs (at the uniform level of 30%) Chile cur- 
rently has a uniform tariff of l l  % and no licenses or other forms of quantitative 
controls. Uruguay implemented a reform in  1978 and, after a brief reversal, 
pushed forward once again in  1986. Bolivia  and Mexico embarked on their 
19. See Krueger (1978, 1981) and Michaely, Choski, and Papageorgiou (1991). 25  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
reforms in 1985-86,  followed by a series of countries in the late 1980s. At the 
current time a number of countries, including Brazil, are proceeding steadily 
with scheduled rounds of tariff reduction and the dismantling of quantitative 
restrictions. However, it is still unclear whether all these reforms will be sus- 
tained, becoming a permanent feature of the Latin economies, or whether some 
of them will be reversed. Developments in Argentina in October 1992 indeed 
suggest that in some countries higher tariffs may be implemented, once again, 
in the near future. 
The Latin American trade reforms have been  characterized by  four basic 
elements: (1) the reduction of the coverage of  nontariff barriers (NTBs), in- 
cluding quotas and prohibitions; (2) the reduction of the average level of im- 
port tariffs; (3) the reduction of the degree of dispersion of the tariff structure; 
and (4) the reduction or elimination of export taxes. In this section I document 
the extent of  the recent liberalization programs, and I provide a preliminary 
evaluation of the effects of these reforms on productivity growth and exports 
expansion. 
1.4.1  The Policies 
Nontariy  Barriers 
A fundamental component of the trade reform programs has been the elimi- 
nation, or at least the severe reduction, of  NTBs coverage. During the early 
and mid-1980s in some countries, such as Colombia and Peru, more than 50% 
of import positions were subject to licenses or outright prohibitions. In Mexico 
NTBs coverage reached almost 100% of import categories in 1984, as was the 
case in most of Central America in 1984 (table 1.1). 
Table  1.4 contains  data  on protectionism  in  1985-87  and  1991-92,  and 
shows that in almost every country the coverage of NTBs has been dramati- 
cally reduced.*" In a number of cases NTBs have been fully eliminated. The 
process through which NTBs have been eased has varied from country to coun- 
try. In some cases, such as Honduras, they were initially replaced by (quasi) 
equivalent import tariffs and then slowly phased out. In other countries, like 
Chile, NTBs were rapidly eliminated without a compensating hike in tariffs. 
As table 1.4 shows, in spite of the progress experienced in the last few years, 
significant NTBs coverage remains in a number of  countries. In most cases 
these NTBs correspond to agricultural products. For example, in Mexico ap- 
proximately 60%  of the agriculture's sector tariff positions were subject to im- 
20. These are unweighted averages and thus are not comparable to those presented in table 1.1. 
There has been a long discussion in applied international trade theory on whether tariffs and NTBs 
should be measured as weighted or unweighted averages. Both views have some merits and some 
limitations. An  obvious problem of  the weighted average approach (where the weights are the 
import shares) is that more restrictive distortions will  tend to have a very  small weight. In the 
extreme case, prohibitive tariffs that effectively ban the importation of a particular item will have 
a zero weight! Corden (1969)  provides an early and still highly relevant discussion on these issues. Table 1.4  The Opening of Latin America: Selected Countries 
Tariff Protection  Coverage of Nontariff  Range  of Import Tariffs 
(tariffs plus paratariffs,  Barriers 
unweighted averages)  (unweighted averages)  1980s  Current 
Min.  Max.  Min.  Max. 




























































































































































Source: World Bank, International Economics Department database; UNCTAD (1987);  Erzan et al. (1989). 27  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
port licenses in mid-1992. In fact, an important feature of the region’s liberal- 
ization programs is that they have proceeded much more slowly in agriculture 
than in industry. This has largely been the result of the authorities’ desire to 
isolate agriculture from fluctuations in world prices and of  unfair trade prac- 
tices by  foreign countries.2‘  However, as a recent study by  Valdes has shown 
(1992), this approach based on NTBs entails serious efficiency costs. Slowly, 
however, more and more countries are addressing these concerns by replacing 
these quantitative restrictions by  variable levies (see Valdes  1992). 
TarifSDispersion 
The import substitution development strategy pursued for decades in Latin 
America  created  highly  dispersed  protective  structures. According  to  the 
World Development Report (1987), Brazil, Chile, and Colombia had some of 
the broadest ranges of  effective rates of  protection in the world during the 
1960s. Also, Heitger (1987) shows that during the 1960s Chile had the highest 
rate of tariff dispersion in the world-with  a standard deviation of 634%- 
closely followed by Colombia and Uruguay. Cardoso and Helwege (1992) have 
pointed out that highly dispersed protective structures generate high welfare 
costs, by  increasing uncertainty and negatively affecting the investment pro- 
cess. These highly dispersed tariffs and NTBs were the result of  decades of 
lobbying by  different sectors to obtain preferential treatment. As the relative 
power of the different lobbies changed, so did their tariff concessions and the 
protective landscape. 
An important goal of the Latin trade reforms has been the reduction of the 
degree of  dispersion of  import tariffs. Table  1.4 contains data on the tariff 
range for a group of countries for two points in time-mid-1980s  (1985-87) 
and  1991-92-and  clearly documents the fact that the reforms have  indeed 
reduced the degree of tariff dispersion. 
In many  cases reducing tariff dispersion has meant  increasing tariffs on 
goods that  were originally exempted from import duties. In  fact, table  1.4 
shows that in many  countries the minimum tariff was 0% in the mid-1980s. 
Generally, zero tariffs have  been applied to intermediate inputs used in the 
manufacturing process.22  From a political economy perspective the process of 
raising some tariffs, while maintaining a proliberalization rhetoric, has not al- 
21. The issue of protecting local producers from dumping is important in the design of the new 
liberalized trade regimes. The crucial problem is to enact legislation that is able to distinguish true 
cases of unfair trade practices from simple cases of increased foreign competition stemming from 
more efficient productive processes. At this time the approval of a dynamic and flexible antidump- 
ing legislation should be high in the region’s agenda for legal and institutional reform. 
22. This system with very low (or zero) tariffs on intermediate inputs and high tariffs on final 
goods generated very high rates of effective protection or protection to domestic value added. In 
recent years a number of authors have argued that the use of effective protection is misleading. 
The reason for this is that effective rates of protection (ERPs) are unable to provide much informa- 
tion on the general equilibrium consequences of tariff changes (Dixit 1986). In spite of this, ERP 
measures are still useful, since they provide an indication on the degree of “inefficiency” a country 
is willing to accept for a particular sector. 28  Sebastian Edwards 
ways been easy. Those sectors that had traditionally benefited from the exemp- 
tions suddenly saw their privileged situation come to an end and tried to op- 
pose them strongly. 
An important question addressed by policymakers throughout the region is, 
by how much should tariff dispersion be reduced? Should the reforms imple- 
ment a uniform tariff, or is some (small) degree of dispersion desirable? From 
a strict welfare perspective uniform tariffs are only advisable under very spe- 
cial cases. However, they have a political economy appeal. More specifically, 
a uniform tariff system is very transparent, making it difficult for the authori- 
ties to grant special treatments to particular firms or sectors (Harberger 1990). 
Average Tariffs 
Reducing the average degree of protections is, perhaps, the fundamental pol- 
icy goal of trade liberalization reforms. Traditional policy manuals on the sub- 
ject suggest that once the exchange rate has been devalued and quantitative 
restrictions have been reduced or eliminated, tariffs should be slashed in a way 
such that both their range and average is reduced.23  Table 1.4 contains data on 
average total tariffs (tariffs plus paratariffs) in 1985 and 1991-92.  As can be 
seen, the extent of tariff reduction has been significant in almost every country. 
Even those nations that have acted somewhat cautiously in the reform front, 
such as Brazil and Ecuador, have experienced important cuts in import tariffs, 
allowing a more competitive  environment and reducing  the degree of  anti- 
export bias of the trade regime. 
Countries that have embarked on trade liberalization  in recent years have 
moved much faster than those nations that decided to open up earlier. There 
has been a clear change in what is perceived to be our abrupt and rapid re- 
moval of imports impediments. What only fifteen years ago were seen as bru- 
tally fast reforms are now looked at as mild and gradual liberalizations. When 
Chile initiated the trade reform in  1975, most analysts thought that the an- 
nounced tariff reduction from an average of 52% to  10% in four and a half 
years was an extremely aggressive move that would cause major dislocations, 
including large increases in unemployment. The view on the speed of reform 
has become very different in the early  1990s, when an increasing number of 
countries have been  opening up their external  sectors very rapidly. For in- 
stance, Colombia slashed (total) import tariffs by  65% in one yea< reducing 
them from 34% in 1990 to 12% in 1991. This fast approach to liberalization 
has also been followed by Argentina and Nicaragua, who eliminated quantita- 
tive restrictions in one bold move and slashed import tariffs from an average 
of  110% in 1990 to 15% in March of  1992. As suggested previously, the speed 
of trade reforms has been directly related to the belief that faster reforms are 
more credible and thus more likely to be sustained through time. 
23. However, “tariffs” is sometimes a misleading term, since many countries have traditionally 
relied on both import duties (that is, tariffs proper) and import duty surcharges, or paratariffs. 29  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
Exchange Rate Policy 
In the vast majority of the countries the first step in the trade reform process 
was the implementation  of  large (nominal) devaluations. In many cases this 
measure represented a unification of the exchange rate market. Most countries 
implemented large exchange rate adjustments as early as 1982 in order to face 
the urgencies of the adjustment process. The purpose of these policies was to 
generate  real exchange rate devaluations, as a way  to reduce the degree of 
antiexport bias of incentives systems. 
Many countries adopted crawling-peg regimes to protect the real exchange 
rate from the effects of inflation. Although these systems helped avoid the ero- 
sion of competitiveness, they also added fuel to the inflationary process. They 
introduced a certain degree of  inflationary inertia,  and have contributed  in 
many countries to the slow reduction of the rate of inflation. More recently, a 
number of countries have begun to use the exchange rate as an anchor in order 
to bring down inflation. This has resulted in the slowing down of the rate of 
crawl below inflation differentials or, in some cases, in the fixing of the ex- 
change rate, as in Argentina. 
Table 1.5 contains data on real exchange rates for a group of Latin American 
countries for 1970, 1980, 1987, and 1991. As is customary in Latin America, 
an increase in the index represents a real exchange rate depreciation and thus 
an improvement in  the degree of  competitiveness. As can be seen between 
1980 and 1987 almost every country in the sample experienced very large real 
depreciations. In many cases, however, these have been partially reversed in 
the last few years. This has been the consequence of a combination of factors, 
including the inflow of  large volumes of foreign capital into these countries 
since 1990, and the use of the exchange rate as the cornerstone of the disinfla- 
tion policies. This issue is addressed in greater detail in section 1.5. 
Table 1.5  Real Exchange Rates in Selected Latin American Countries 
(1985 = 100) 













78.7  35.8  80.7  44.0 
98.3  88.1  107.9  112.1 
51.9  70.7  78.0  51.4 
29.4  55.3  94.8  83.0 
86.1  79.2  115.9  126.3 
58.4  65.8  94.9  97.2 
118.6  105.6  153.3  173.7 
86.1  83.3  123.9  77.0 
104.6  74.4  111.4  114.3 
59.3  77.1  46.  I  23.1 
73.0  49.7  77.2  62.0 
80.3  84.2  134.8  132.8 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 30  Sebastian Edwards 
1.4.2  Adjustment and Productivity 
The relaxation of trade impediments has had a fundamental impact on the 
region’s economies. Suddenly, Latin America’s industry, which to a large extent 
had  developed  and  grown  behind  protective  walls,  was forced to compete. 
Many firms have not been able to survive this shock and have become bank- 
rupt.  Others, however, have faced the challenge of  lower protection by  em- 
barking on major restructuring and by increasing their level of productivity. 
The ability (and willingness) of  firms to implement significant adjustment 
depends on two main factors: the degree of credibility of the reform, and the 
level of distortions in the labor market. If entrepreneurs believe that the reform 
will not persist through time, there will be no incentives to incur the costs of 
adjusting the product mix and of increasing the degree of productive efficiency. 
In fact, if the reform is perceived as temporary, the optimal behavior is not to 
adjust; instead it is profitable  to speculate through the accumulation of  im- 
ported durable goods. This was, as Rodriguez (1982) has documented, the case 
in Argentina during the failed Martinez de Hoz reforms.24 
Labor market conditions affect the adjustment process in several ways. First, 
in order to survive, firms facing stiffer foreign competition have to increase 
labor productivity, which in many cases means reducing the number of work- 
ers. This reduction in employment will tend to be offset by  new hires in ex- 
panding firms in the sectors with comparative advantage. Many times, how- 
ever, existing labor market regulations are extremely cumbersome, inhibiting 
the adjustment process and forcing out of business firms that are structurally 
viable in the long run. Additionally, labor market distortions negatively affect 
the  investment  process,  including  direct  foreign  investment  (see  Cox- 
Edwards 1992). 
In their studies on the interaction between labor markets and structural re- 
forms, Krueger (1980) and Michaely, Choski, and Papageorgiou (1991) found 
that most successful trade reforms have indeed resulted in major increases in 
labor productivity. This has been the case in some of the early Latin American 
reforms for which there are data. For example, according to Edwards and Cox- 
Edwards  (1991) labor productivity  in the Chilean manufacturing  sector in- 
creased at an average annual rate of  13.4% between  1978 and  1981. On the 
other hand, the available evidence suggests that the increases in labor produc- 
tivity in the Mexican manufacturing sector in the postreform period have been 
moderate. According to World Bank (1992) data, labor productivity in Mexico 
barely increased between 1988 and 1991-the  index went from 92.7 to 105.1. 
In a recent study Ibarra (1992) has calculated that labor productivity  in the 
Mexican manufacturing  sector-excluding  the maquiladora sector-has  in- 
creased at an average rate of 2.3% per annum. 
24. See Corbo, Condon, and de Melo (1985) for a detailed microeconomic account of the pro- 
cess of  adjustment in a large group of Chilean manufacturing firms. 31  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
As discussed in section  1.2, recent models of  growth have suggested that 
countries that are more open to the rest of the world will exhibit a faster rate 
of technological improvement. From an empirical point of view this means that 
countries that open up their external sectors and engage in trade liberalization 
reforms, will experience an increase in TFP growth relative to the prereform 
period. Table  1.6 contains data on the change in TFP growth in the period 
following the implementation of trade liberalization reform in six Latin coun- 
tries.25 As can be seen, Chile and Costa Rica, two of  the earlier reformers, 
experienced very large increases in TIT  growth in the postreform period. The 
results for Chile coincide with those obtained by Edwards (1983, who found 
that in the late 1970s, after the trade reforms had been completed, TFP growth 
was approximately three times higher than the historical average.2h  Although 
the outcome  has been  less spectacular, Argentina  and Uruguay  still exhibit 
substantial improvements in productivity  growth in the period following the 
opening up. Bolivia, on the other hand, presents a flat profile of TFP growth. 
Sturzenegger (1992) argues that the very slow improvement in Bolivian pro- 
ductivity growth has been, to a large extent, the result  of  negative terms of 
trade shocks and, in particular of the collapse of the tin market. 
Perhaps the most interesting and puzzling result in table  1.6 is the slight 
decline in aggregate TFP growth in Mexico after the reforms. Martin (1992) 
shows that  this  finding  is robust  to alternative  methods  of  measuring TFP 
growth, including different procedures for correcting for capacity utilization. 
Also, Harberger  (1992) finds a slowing down of TFP growth in Mexico in 
1986-90 relative to 1975-82. However, the aggregate nature of the TFP growth 
data in table 1.6 tends to obscure the actual sectoral response to the trade re- 
form. According to new theories on endogenous growth, faster productivity 
will be observed in those sectors where protectionism has been reduced, and 
not in those still subject to trade bamers or other forms of regulations. 
A distinctive  characteristic of  the Mexican reform is that, contrary to the 
Chilean case, it has been uneven. In particular, while most of the manufactur- 
ing sector-with  the exception of automobiles-has  experienced a significant 
reduction in protection, agriculture continues to be subject to relatively high 
tariffs and substantial NTBs. Moreover, until very recently the Mexican land 
tenure system was subject to substantial distortions that, among other things, 
25. The original TFP growth data comes from Martin’s (1992) study on sources of growth in 
Latin America. The countries in table 1.6 are those that initiated the reform before 1988. In order 
to compute series on TFP growth, Martin  (1992) analyzed the contributions of capital and labor 
and explicitly incorporated the role of changes in the degree of capital utilization. The countries 
considered in this study are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Repub- 
lic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezu- 
ela. Harberger (1992) presents data on TFP growth before and after a series of historical trade 
reform episodes. He finds that in the majority of the cases productivity growth increased after the 
liberalization process. 
26. It may be argued, however, that  the major increase in  TFP growth in  Chile has been the 
result of the complete structural reform package implemented in that country. 32  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 1.6  Changes in Total Factor Productivity Growth 
~ 
Argentina  I 91  Costa Rica  3 25 
Chile  496  UNgUaY  2 02 
Bolivia  0 11  Mexico  -0  32 
Source: Martin (1992). 
Note: For all countries but Chile, computed as the difference of  TFP growth for 1987-91  and 
1978-82.  For Chile the prereform period is 1972-78. 
severely restricted the market for land-the  ejido system. Additionally, during 
much of the post-debt crisis period large fragments of services sector-includ- 
ing telecommunications and financial services-  were under direct government 
control and subject to distortions. 
Table 1.7 contains data on TFP growth in Mexico’s manufacturing sector for 
1 940-89.27 Interestingly enough, these figures indicate that in the post-trade 
reform period the rate of productivity growth in the Mexican manufacturing 
sector has exceeded every subperiod since 1940 for which there are data. This 
provides some evidence in favor of  the view that, once the sectors actually 
subject to increased competition are considered, Mexican productivity growth 
has indeed improved after the trade reform. It should be noted, however, that 
recent TFP growth in manufacturing in Mexico (see table 1.8 for disaggregated 
data) has not been as large as in Chile’s postreform period, where some sectors 
experienced growth in TFP of the order of  15% in 1978-82  (Fuentes 1992). 
There are a number of  possible  explanations  for this marked  difference in 
behavior,  including  the  uncertainties  about  North  American  Free  Trade 
Agreement approval, which  resulted  in  the postponement  of  investment in 
some of the key manufacturing sectors subject to increased foreign exposure. 
By and large, however, the data analyzed in this subsection provides broad 
support to the position that TFP growth has tended to increase in the period 
following major trade reforms in Latin America. 
1.4.3  Trade Reforms and Exports 
An important goal of the reforms has been to reduce the traditional degree 
of antiexport bias of Latin American trade regimes, and to generate a surge in 
exports. This reduction of the bias is expected to take place through three chan- 
nels: a more competitive-that  is more devalued-real  exchange rate; a reduc- 
tion in the cost of imported capital goods and intermediate inputs used in the 
production of  exportable goods; and a direct shift in relative prices in favor 
of exports. 
The volume of international  trade in Latin America, and in particular of 
27. Since these figures come from two different sources, they may not be fully comparable and 
thus should be interpreted with care. 33  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
Table 1.7  Total Factor Productivity Growth in Manufacturing 
in Mexico, 1940-90  (%) 
~~~~ 
1940-SO  0.46 
1950-60  0.53 
1960-70  3.00 
1970-80  N.A. 
1985-89  3.40 
Sources:  The data for  1940-80  are from Elias (1992). The figure for 1985-89  is from Ibarra 
(1992). 
Table 1.8  Disaggregated  Productivity Growth, in Mexico’s Manufacturing 
Sector, 1985-90  (%) 
Division  Labor Productivity  Total Factor Productivity 
Food, beverages, and tobacco 
Textiles and apparel 
Wood products 
Paper and printing 


























Source: Ibarra (1992). 
exports, increased significantly after the reforms were initiated.z8  For example, 
while for the region as a whole the volume of exports grew at an annual rate of 
only 2.0% between 1970 and 1980, it grew at a rate of 5.5% between 1980 and 
1985, and at a rate of 6.7% between 1986 and 1990.29  Although, strictly speak- 
ing, it is not possible to fully attribute this export surge to the opening-up 
reforms, there is significant country-specific evidence suggesting that a more 
open economy, and in particular a more depreciated real exchange rate, has 
positively affected exports growth.3o  Some countries, especially Costa Rica, 
have accompanied the opening-up process with the implementation of a bat- 
28. Trade liberalization aims at increasing a country’s total volume of trade. Under textbook 
conditions it is expected that at the end of the reform trade will be balanced. However, there are a 
number of circumstances, including the need to pay the country’s foreign debt, under which trade 
will not grow in a balanced way after a reform. This has been the case in the majority of the Latin 
American countries. 
29. The real value of exports, however, has evolved at a somewhat slower pace. The reason for 
this is that terms of trade have experienced, in every subgroup of countries, a significant deteriora- 
tion during 1980-91  (see CEPAL 1991). These data are from CEPAL (1991). 
30. See, for example, Nogues and Gulati (1992). 34  Sebastian Edwards 
tery of export promotion schemes, including tax credits-through  the Certifi- 
cad0 de Abono Tributario-duty-free  imports, and income tax exemptions. 
However, some authors, including Nogues and Gulati (1992), have argued that 
these systems have not been an effective way of encouraging exports. 
Table  1.9 presents detailed country-level data on the rate of growth of  the 
total value of exports (in constant dollars) for three periods. Table 1.10, on the 
other hand, contains information on the evolution of exports volume through- 
out the period. A number of facts emerge from these tables. First, while there 
has been a rapid growth in exports for the region as a whole, there are nontriv- 
ial variations across countries; in some cases there has even been a decline in 
the real value of exports-this  is the case, for example, of Peru. Second, ex- 
ports performance during two of the subperiods (1982-87  and  1987-91)  has 
not  been  homogeneous. In  the majority of  the countries exports performed 
significantly better during 1987-9  1, than in the previous five years, reflecting, 
among other things, the fact that it takes some time for exports to actually 
respond to greater incentives. 
An interesting fact that emerges from these tables is that in the country that 
has lagged behind in terms of  trade reform-Ecuador-the  performance of 
exports volume has been in recent years below the 1970-80 historical average. 
On the other hand, in two of the early reformers-Bolivia  and Chile-exports 
had a very strong behavior in the 1987-91  subperiod. 
The case of Chile is particularly interesting. Since most of its liberalization 
effort was undertaken prior to 1980, there are enough data points to provide a 
Table 1.9  Value of Exports of Goods and Nonfactor Services: 
Annual Growth Rates (%) 

















































Sources: World Bank, International Economics Department database; ECLAC, Sfarisrical Yeur- 
book for Latin America, several issues. 
Note: Based on constant 1990 prices (U.S. dollars). 
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Table 1.10  Volume of Exports: Annual Growth Rates (%) 

















































Sources: World Bank. International Economics Department database; ECLAC, Statistical  Year- 
book for Latin America, several issues. 
“Changes over the period 1981-87. 
more detailed evaluation of export response to the new regime. Between 1975 
and 1980-when  tariffs were reduced to a uniform 10% and NTBs were com- 
pletely eliminated-the  behavior of Chilean exports was spectacular, growing 
(in volume terms) at an average of 12% per year-many  times higher than the 
historical average of  1960-70  of only 2.6% per annum. What is particularly 
impressive is that  most  of  the  exports surge has  taken  place  in  the  non- 
traditional  sector,  including  manufacturing,  agriculture,  and  fishing  pro- 
ducts (CEPAL 1991). 
Among the early reformers, Mexico exhibits a rather slower rate of growth 
of total exports in the postreform period than during 1970-80.  This, however, 
is largely an illusion stemming from the fact that during the 1970s Mexico’s oil 
production increased substantially-at  a rate exceeding 18% per year. When 
nontraditional exports are considered, the postreform performance is remark- 
able, with an annual average rate of growth for 1985-91  exceeding 25%.31 
A stated objective of trade reforms has been to increase the degree of diver- 
sification of exports. Tables 1.11 and 1.12 contain data on the share of nontradi- 
tional exports and manufacturing exports for a large number of countries, and 
show that in the period following the trade reforms their importance has in- 
creased steadily. Also, in the majority of the countries the share of the ten most 
important export goods in  total exports has declined significantly in the last 
few years (CEPAL 1991). 
A critical question is whether the rapid growth and diversification of exports 
in Latin America will be sustained, or whether it will be a temporary phenome- 
31. A large percentage of  this growth, however, has been in the maquiladora, or in-bond sector. 36  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 1.11  Composition of Exports of Goods: Nontraditional ExportslTotal 
Exports 
Country  1980  1982  1985  1987  I990 
Argentina  0.27  0.3  1  0.28  0.3  1  0.39 
Bolivia  0.15  0.09  0.05  0.19  0.47 
Brazil  0.57  0.59  0.66  0.69  0.70 
Chile  0.38  0.22  0.35  0.39  N.A. 
Colombia  0.41  0.42  0.41  0.55  0.64 
Costa Rica  0.36  0.38  0.37  0.42  0.54 
Ecuador  0.24  0.09  0.12  0.14  0.10 
Mexico  0.13  0.20  0.18  0.38  0.43 
Paraguay  0.58  0.7  I  0.82  0.68  0.65 
PeN  0.21  0.23  0.24  0.27  0.29 
Uruguay  0.61  0.58  0.66  0.67  0.63 
Venezuela  0.04  0.07  0.09  0.13  0.19 
Source: ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America, several issues 
Table 1.12  Composition of Exports of Goods: Exports of Manufactures/Total 
Exports 
Country  1970  1980  I982  1985  1987  1990 
Argentina 



































0.24  0.21  0.3  1  0.29 
0.03  0.01  0.03  0.05 
0.38  0.44  0.50  0.52 
0.07  0.11  0.09  0.10 
0.24  0.17  0.19  0.25 
0.25  0.22  0.24  N.A. 
0.03  0.01  0.02  0.02 
0.10  0.21  0.38  0.43 
0.09  0.06  0.10  0.10 
0.16  0.  I3  0.17  N.A. 
0.32  0.35  0.55  0.50 
0.02  0.10  0.06  0.15 
Source: ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America, several issues. 
non. To  a large extent this will depend on the policies undertaken, and on the 
behavior of  variables such as the real exchange rate. This is the subject of the 
next section. 
1.5  Recent Real Exchange Rate Behavior in Latin America 
In the last years competitive real exchange rates have been at the center of 
the vigorous  performance of  most of  Latin  America’s external  sectors.  Re- 
cently, however, in most Latin countries real exchange rates have experienced 
rapid real appreciations (fig. 1.1). These developments have generated consid- 37  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
erable concern among policymakers and political leaders. A number of observ- 
ers have argued that the reduction in exports competitiveness is negatively af- 
fecting the most dynamic sectors in these economies, reducing growth and 
employment expansion (see Calvo, Leideman, and Reinhart 1992). 
These real appreciations have been the result of two basic factors: first, the 
use in many countries of the exchange rate policy as an anti-inflationary tool 
and, second, massive capital inflows into Latin America that have made foreign 
exchange “overabundant.” 
In the late 1980s some analysts, including the staff of the IMF, argued that 
the crawling-peg  regimes  adopted  by most of  Latin  America  after the debt 
crisis had become excessively  inflationary.  In  particular,  it was  argued that 
crawling pegs introduce  substantial inflation inertia. According  to this view 
exchange rate policy in the developing countries should move toward greater 
rigidity-and  even complete fixity-as  a way to introduce financial discipline, 
provide a nominal anchor, and reduce inflation.” 
A number of Latin countries have, in fact, decided to use an exchange rate 
anchor as a way to reduce inflation. In practice they have done this by either 
slowing down the rate of the crawl-as  in Mexico and Chile, to some extent- 
or by adopting a completely fixed nominal exchange rate-as  in Argentina and 
Nicaragua. Much of  the recent enthusiasm for fixed nominal exchange rates is 
intellectually rooted in the modem credibility and time consistency literat~re.~~ 
According to this approach, which was pioneered by Calvo (1978) and Kyd- 
land and Prescott (1977), governments that have the discretion to alter the nom- 
inal exchange rate-as  in the crawling-peg system-will  tend to abuse their 
power, introducing an inflationary bias into the economy. The reason for this 
is that under a set of plausible conditions, such as the existence of labor market 
rigidities that preclude  the economy from reaching  full employment,  it will 
be optimal for the government  to “surprise”  the private sector through  un- 
expected  devaluation^.^^ 
By engineering (unexpected) devaluations the government hopes to induce 
a reduction in real wages and thus an increase in employment and a boost in 
output. Naturally, in equilibrium  the public will be aware of this incentive faced 
by the authorities and will react to it by anticipating the devaluation surprises, 
hence, rendering them ineffective. As a consequence of this strategic interac- 
tion between the government and the private sector, the economy will reach a 
high inflation plateau. What is particularly interesting about this result is that 
this inflationary bias will be present even if it is explicitly assumed that the 
32. For a flavor of the discussion within the IMF, see, for example, Burton and Gillman (1991); 
Aghevli, Khan, and Montiel (1991); Flood and Marion (1991). In Edwards (1993) I deal with 
some of  these issues. 
33. The new impetus for fixed rates has strongly emerged in the IMF. See Aghevli, Khan, and 
Montiel (1991). 
34. This assumes that wages are set before the government implements the exchange rate policy 
but after it has been announced. ARGENTINA  BRAZIL 
OH 
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Fig. 1.1 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
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government has an aversion for inflation. This is because the government per- 
ceives that the marginal benefits of higher inflation-associated  with the in- 
crease in employment once nominal wages have been set-outweigh  its mar- 
ginal costs (see Persson and Tabellini 1990). 
An important feature of the credibility literature is that under most circum- 
stances policy  commitment is welfare-superior to discretionary policy. If  the 
government can credibly commit itself to low (or no) inflation, society will be 
better off employment will be the same as in the discretionary policy case, but 
inflation will be lower. The problem, however, is that governments have a hard 
time making credible commitments. In the absence of effective constraints that 
will tie the government’s hands, any promise of low inflationary policy will not 
be credible and thus will be self-defeating. 
A key policy implication of this literature is that defining (and implement- 
ing) constraints that will make government precommitments credible will re- 
sult in an improvement in society’s welfare. Here fixed (or predetermined) ex- 
change rates come into the picture. It has been argued that the adoption of a 
fixed exchange rate will constrain governments’ ability to surprise the private 
sector through unexpected devaluations. Promises of fiscal discipline will be- 
come credible, and private sector actions will not elicit successive rounds of 
inflationary actions (Aghevli, Khan, and Montiel  1991). In particular,  it has 
been argued that fixed exchange rates provide a reputational constraint on gov- 
ernment behavior. The authorities know that if they undertake overly expansive 
credit policy  they will be forced  to abandon the parity and devalue. As the 
recent (mid-1992) crisis of the exchange rate mechanism has shown, exchange 
rate crises can indeed shatter the reputation of politicians. 
In spite of its elegant appeal, this view has, in its simplest incarnation, some 
serious problems. First, in these simple settings exchange rate policy has a very 
limited role. In fact, in most of these models its only effect is to alter the do- 
mestic rate of  inflation. That is the channel  through  which the government 
alters real wages. However, in most modern exchange rate models, nominal 
devaluations can also help accommodate shocks to real exchange rate funda- 
mentals-including  shocks to the terms of  trade-helping  to avoid real ex- 
change rate misalignment.3s Second, in economies with stochastic shocks, con- 
tingent exchange rate rules can, at least in principle, be superior to fixed rates 
(Flood and Isard 1989). Third, it is not clear why a country that can credibly 
commit itself to unilaterally fixing the exchange rate cannot commit itself to 
providing a monetary anchor. 
However, one of the most serious limitations of the nominal exchange rate 
anchor policy is that, under almost every circumstance, once the exchange rate 
is fixed, other prices-including  wages-will  continue to increase, generating 
a change in relative prices in favor of nontradables. This has indeed been the 
case in both Argentina and Nicaragua, the two countries in Latin America that 
35. See, for example, Edwards (198%). 41  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
in the early 1990s adopted strictly fixed exchange rates as a way to drastically 
reduce inflation. In both cases the stabilization programs were based on a se- 
vere fiscal correction that virtually eliminated the fiscal deficit, on restrictive 
credit, and on a nominal exchange rate anchor. Although this policy succeeded 
in both countries in greatly reducing inflation, it has resulted in serious relative 
price misalignment. In Argentina this has been reflected in the fact that whole- 
sale price inflation, which is heavily influenced by tradables, is only 3% per 
year, while consumer price inflation-highly  dependent on nontradables-ex- 
ceeds  18% per year. In  Nicaragua tradable-related  inflation rates have been 
very low (in the order of 2-3%),  while nontradable inflation has exceeded 30% 
in the last twelve months. 
Mexico followed a variant of the exchange rate anchor policy, announcing a 
predetermined rate of devaluation at a pace deliberately below ongoing infla- 
tion. The purpose of this policy has been both to anchor tradables prices and 
to reduce expectations. However, since domestic inflation has systematically 
exceeded the predetermined rate of devaluation, Mexico experienced a sizable 
real appreciation, which exceeded 35% between 1985 and mid-1992. 
The  second  cause  behind  the  generalized  real  appreciations  in  Latin 
America has been the large increase in capital inflows into the region in the last 
two years. As table 1.13 shows, after eight years of negative resource transfers, 
1991-92  saw a significant turnaround (see table 1.14 for more disaggregated 
data). This increased  availability of  foreign funds has affected  the real ex- 
change rate  through  increased  aggregate  expenditure.  A  proportion  of  the 
newly available resources has been spent on nontradables-including  in the 
real estate sector-putting  pressure on their relative prices and on domestic 
inflation. An interesting feature of the recent capital movements is that a large 
proportion corresponds to portfolio investment and relatively little is direct for- 
eign investment. 
Real exchange rate appreciation generated by  increased capital inflows is 
not a completely new phenomenon in Latin America. In the late 1970s most 
countries in the region, but especially the Southern Cone nations, were flooded 
with foreign resources that led to large real appreciations. The fact that this 
Table 1.13  Capital Inflows and Net Resource Transfers: Latin America, 1981-92 
Net Capital Inflows  Interest and Profit Income  Net Resource Transfers 
1982-85  55.3 
1986-89  33.5 
1990  17.0 
1991  36.3 
1992"  42.8 
-111.7 






-  18.7 
5.2 
21.6 
Source: Jaspersen (1992). 
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Table 1.14  Net Capital Inflows as Percentage of GDP in Selected Latin 
American Countries 
Country  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Argentina  2.4  0.5  3.0  2.9  1.8  2.6  3.9  0.2  1.0  6.3 
Brazil  4.2  2.1  1.8  0.1  0.6  1.3  -0.5  0.4  1.3  0.2 
Chile  4.4  2.3  8.3  5.0  3.0  3.7  3.7  4.3  7.8  2.5 
Colombia  6.5  4.1  2.6  5.9  2.9  0.0  2.1  1.0  0.0  2.8 
Mexico  5.6  -1.5  -0.6  -1.2  0.7  -0.7  -0.8  0.8  5.0  10.6 
Peru  5.7  2.4  3.4  1.1  2.1  2.3  3.5  1.5  2.4  9.5 
Venezuela  -2.5  -6.6  -3.6  -1.8  -1.9  0.8  -1.5  -5.7  -4.1  4.9 
Source: Inter-American  Development Bank, Economic and  Social  Progress  in Latin America 
(1992). 
previous episode ended in the debt crisis has added dramatically to the current 
concern on the possible negative effects of these capital flows. 
Whether these capital movements are temporary-and  thus subject to sud- 
den reversals as in 1982-is  particularly important in evaluating their possible 
consequences. In a recent study Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1992) argue 
that the most important causes behind the generalized inflow of resources are 
external. In particular, their empirical analysis suggests that the recession in 
the industrialized world and the reduction in U.S. interest rates are the two 
main causes that have triggered these capital movements. These authors sug- 
gest that once these world economic conditions change, the volume capital of 
capital flowing to Latin America will be reduced. This means that at that point 
the pressure over the real exchange rate will subside and a real exchange rate 
depreciation will be required. 
The countries in the region have  tried to cope with the real appreciation 
pressures in several ways. Colombia, for instance, tried to sterilize the accumu- 
lation of reserves by  placing domestic bonds (OMAs) in the local market in 
1991.36  However, in order to place these bonds the local interest rate had to 
increase, malung them relatively more attractive. This generated a widening 
interest rate differential in favor of  Colombia, which attracted new  capital 
flows that, in order to be sterilized, required new bond placements. This pro- 
cess generated a vicious cycle that contributed to a very large accumulation 
of  domestic debt, without significantly affecting the real exchange rate. This 
experience shows vividly the difficulties faced by  the authorities wishing to 
handle  real  exchange rate  movements.  In  particular,  it  indicates that  real 
shocks-such  as an increase in foreign capital inflows-cannot  be  tackled 
successfully using exclusively monetary policy instruments. 
Argentina has  recently tried to deal with  the real  appreciation by  engi- 
neering a “pseudo” devaluation through a simultaneous increase in import tar- 
36. An important peculiarity of the Colombia case is that the original inflow of foreign exchange 
came through the trade account. 43  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
iffs and export subsidies. Although it is too early to know how this measure 
will affect the degree of competitiveness in the country, preliminary computa- 
tions suggest that the magnitude of the adjustment obtained via a tariffs-cum- 
subsidies package may be rather small. Mexico has followed a different route, 
and has decided to postpone the adoption of a completely fixed exchange rate. 
In October 1992 the pace of the daily nominal exchange rate adjustment was 
doubled to 40 cents. As in the case of Argentina, it is too early to evaluate how 
effective these measures have been in dealing with the real appreciation trend. 
Chile has tackled the real appreciation by implementing a broad set of meas- 
ures, including conducting exchange rate policy relative to a three-currency 
basket, imposing reserve requirements on capital inflows, and undertaking lim- 
ited sterilization operations. In spite of this multifront approach, Chile has not 
avoided real exchange rate pressures. Between December 1991 and July 1992 
the Chilean bilateral real exchange rate appreciated almost 10%.  As a result, 
exporters and agriculture producers have been mounting increasing pressure 
on the government for special treatment, arguing that by allowing the real ex- 
change rate to appreciate an implicit contract has been broken. This type of 
political reaction is becoming more and more generalized throughout the re- 
gion, adding a difficult social dimension to the real exchange rate issue. 
Although there is no easy way  to handle the real appreciation pressures, 
historical experience shows that there are at least two possible avenues that the 
authorities can follow. First, in those countries where the dominant force be- 
hind real exchange rate movements is price inertia in the presence of nominal 
exchange rate anchor policies, the adoption of  a pragmatic crawling-peg sys- 
tem will usually help. This means that, to some extent, the inflationary targets 
will have  to be  less ambitious, as a periodic exchange rate adjustment will 
result in some inflation.37  However, to the extent that this policy is supple- 
mented by tight overall fiscal policy there should be no concern regarding in- 
flationary explosions. Second, the discrimination between short-term (specula- 
tive) capital and longer-tern capital should go a long way in helping resolve 
the preoccupations regarding the effects of  capital movements on real  ex- 
change rates. To the extent that capital inflows are genuinely long term, and 
especially if they help finance investment projects in the tradables sector, the 
change in the real exchange rate will be a “true equilibrium” phenomenon and 
should be recognized as such by  implementing the required adjustment re- 
source allocation. 
1.6  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have  dealt with trade policy and growth. The analysis has 
focused on the long-run relationship between trade orientation and productiv- 
ity improvements, as well as on some of the most important transitional issues. 
37. More specifically, with this option the one-digit inflationary goal will be postponed. 44  Sebastian Edwards 
With regard to the latter, the analysis has focused on the recent Latin Ameri- 
can experiences. 
In  section 1.2 I  argued that more open economies will experience faster 
rates of productivity growth than countries that distort their external sectors. A 
regression analysis based on a broad cross-country data set provided support 
for this view. The analysis of the recent Latin reforms presented in section 1.4 
also supports the hypothesis that those countries that have embarked in trade 
liberalization programs have experienced an acceleration in the rate of produc- 
tivity growth. However, the data on Mexico indicate that in order for productiv- 
ity increases to be widespread it is necessary to implement broad reforms and 
deregulation programs that affect a wide range of sectors. In section 1.5  I dis- 
cussed the evolution of real exchange rates in the region, and I pointed out that 
the recently observed generalized real appreciations have become a cause of 
concern among policymakers. A key  element in determining the effects of 
these flows, and in designing policy response packages, is whether these move- 
ments are temporary or permanent. If the latter, it is difficult to justify an activ- 
ist stance in economic policy. 
Appendix A 
TFP Growth Computations 
One of the difficulties in computing TFP growth series for a large number of 
countries is that capital-stock series are rarely available. One way to deal with 
this problem is to use data on investment-GDP ratios (Harberger 1992). The 
problem with this approach, however, is that it requires data on the capital- 
output ratio. Although these are not generally available, they can be obtained 
using alternative procedures. 
TFP growth (p) is defined in the following way: 
p = (Y/y) -  a(k/K) -  (1 -  OWL), 
where y is real GDP, K  is the stock of capital, L is employment, and a  is the 
share of capital in GDP. Since (K/K)  is equal to gross investment (0,  equation 
(Al) can be rewritten as follows: 
(Z/y) is the gross investment to GDP ratio and is readily available. (y/K)  on the 
other hand is the inverse of the capital-output ratio and has to be estimated. 
In order to obtain data on p, in this paper I have used the following proce- 
dure. First, I used specific country time series data for 1950-88  to estimate 
GDP growth equations with (Uy) and rate of  growth of  population (a proxy 45  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
i/L)  as regressors. From these regressions I obtained estimated values for pa- 
rameters  [a(y/K)]  and [l -  a]  in equation (A2). In the second stage, I used 
these coefficients to construct TFP data using equation (A2). In the third stage 
I averaged the estimated TFPs for 1971-82 for each country. This average cor- 
responds to variable TFPl used in the regression analysis in section 1.2. 
A limitation of the procedure described above is that it assumes a constant 
capital-output ratio (Wy)  in computing [a(y/K)]  in (A2). However, it is likely 
that this ratio will change through time.  In particular, we can  assume that 
(y/K) = (y/K), + y time. In this case (A2) can be rewritten as 
(A3)  p = (y/y) -  [a(y/K)(l/y)  + [ay](l/y>  X time + (1 -  a)(&L)]. 
This equation was estimated for each of the fifty-four countries to compute the 
TFP2 variable in section 1.2. 
Finally, TFP3 was constructed using cross-country estimates of [a(Z/y)] in 
equation (A2). A shortcoming of this approach is that is assumes the same 
coefficient across countries. In that regard, TFP3 can be considered a less de- 
sirable measure of TFP growth. 
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Comment  Miguel A. Savastano 
Sebastian Edwards has written a concise and informative progress report on 
trade reforms in Latin America over the past decade. The task was particularly 
difficult, considering that during that period the countries of the region under- 
went dramatic changes and were exposed to almost every imaginable shock, 
domestic  and external. The paper addresses most of the issues relevant  for 
understanding the recent evolution of trade policy in Latin America, identifies 
some common trends, and analyzes their implications for the region’s growth 
prospects. However, even after taking into account space limitations, I feel that 
some of the important issues raised in the paper may have required a fuller and 
more comprehensive discussion. My comments will  focus on four of these 
issues. 
The first issue has to do with the starting point of  the trade liberalization 
process in  Latin America. Edwards places  the  start of this  generalized  and 
renewed impetus with trade reform at the late 1980s, when all the protectionist 
measures that had been imposed as part of the adjustment to the debt crisis 
began to be  dismantled.  Although  it is unquestionable  that the region as a 
whole has nowadays a much more open trade regime (especially in terms of 
the level of imports protection) than six or seven years ago, I find it a little 
misleading to claim that it all started then. In at least one aspect Latin America 
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had become an outward-oriented region long before the late  1980s; this was 
on recognizing the importance of maintaining a depreciated real exchange rate 
(RER)  and of diversifying its export base. In fact, the data reported in tables 
1.5 and  1.12 show clearly that the large RER  depreciations and the surge of 
manufacturing exports occurred in the early 1980s and cannot be attributed to 
the recent opening up. Admittedly, those features reflect the region’s response 
to the urgent  need  for effecting  a large transfer abroad in the  midst of  the 
debt crisis and were far from being part of a liberal strategy aimed at reducing 
domestic distortions, but they nevertheless went a long way in creating an ex- 
port mentality and reducing the antiexport bias that had characterized the re- 
gion in the preceding two decades. Moreover, there is little doubt that the large 
real depreciations that such a response provoked in most Latin American coun- 
tries by the mid-1980s exerted a strong influence on the region’s developments 
of  the  following  years,  including  the  particular  way  in  which  the  recent 
opening-up has taken place. 
The second issue is related to what I consider a striking feature of the recent 
trade liberalization episodes reviewed in the paper: the fact that they were im- 
plemented much faster than in the past and in many cases without conforming 
with  what  Edwards calls the “conventional  wisdom” on the appropriate  se- 
quence of liberalization (wisdom that he himself has contributed to form). Spe- 
cifically, in the past few years countries like Argentina, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
and Peru cut drastically the level of import protection almost at the same time 
as they embarked on major stabilization efforts that resulted in a large real 
appreciation of  their currencies. In all these cases the authorities’ overriding 
(and understandable) concern for reducing inflation prevailed  in the dispute 
for the crucial instrument (the exchange rate) at the expense of the real depreci- 
ation that in theory was required  by  the  tariff reduction.  This raises a very 
important  question:  to  what  extent  do  these  attempts  at  stabilizing  and 
opening-up simultaneously have to be considered the result of a “bad” policy 
decision that in the end will jeopardize the sustainability of the trade reforms? 
Clearly, if one were to answer this question following strictly the “conventional 
wisdom,” the reforms would not seem to stand a chance to succeed because of 
the substantial RER  appreciation experienced so far by these countries. How- 
ever, I think that a closer look at these episodes is somewhat more reassuring, 
as it reveals at least two elements that distinguish them from the long list of 
frustrated liberalization attempts in Latin America’s recent history:  first, that 
most of the trade reforms started at a point where the RER  was highly depreci- 
ated  (some analysts would  even  say overdepreciated); and  second, that  the 
trade reforms were just one element of a broader package  supported by ex- 
tremely  tight  financial  policies  that  marked  a drastic  (and so far credible) 
change in the “policy regime” of  these countries. It would be interesting to 
know  whether Edwards thinks that these two factors will  suffice to sustain 
these countries’ trade reforms or whether he feels that a major adjustment of 
their nominal exchange rates will still be required. 51  Trade Policy, Exchange Rates, and Growth 
I also had problems with the paper’s discussion of the effects on total factor 
productivity of the recent trade liberalizations. Specifically, I have some reser- 
vations regarding the time that should be given to a trade reform before one 
can reasonably expect to observe some improvements in factor productivity. In 
this regard I wonder whether it is appropriate (or fair, for that matter) to com- 
pare the increases in factor productivity  in a group of recent liberalizers with 
those experienced by Chile, where structural reforms have had more than a 
decade to consolidate (table 1.6).  In the context of this comparison, Edwards 
seems especially concerned about the modest gains in total factor productivity 
in Mexico following the comprehensive reforms of the trade and investment 
regimes of the late 1980s. Even after discounting for the relatively short period 
the reforms have been in place, however, I tend to share Edwards’s concern. 
Mexico’s growth performance in the postreform years has been far from spec- 
tacular, despite the pronounced  increase in foreign capital inflows (most of 
them in the form of portfolio investment) and the sustained growth of imports 
of intermediate and capital goods. The sluggish response of output might well 
be related to the prominence given to the inflation objective and to the major 
reallocation of factors prompted by the structural reforms. Furthermore, if one 
follows the implications of Aaron Tornell’s model (in chap. 2 of this volume), 
that sluggishness can even be interpreted  as a “blessing in disguise”  in the 
sense that it has prevented the ‘‘size of the pie” from increasing before NAFTA 
locks in the reforms and eliminates the incentives for rent-seeking behavior. 
Quite independently of the story one wants to believe, however, I agree with 
Edwards that the actual growth figures suggest very clearly that the transition 
period is not over and that Mexico has yet to find the path of rapid and sustain- 
able growth that has historically characterized the successful reformers. 
Finally, on the issue of how to deal with the real appreciation syndrome that 
has recently spread throughout Latin America, Edwards outlines two types of 
responses. In a nutshell, he suggests that in those cases where the appreciation 
has been driven by the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor the authori- 
ties should adopt a “pragmatic” crawling peg and accept a less ambitious infla- 
tion target; while in those cases where the appreciation is being caused by 
genuinely long-term capital inflows the authorities should refrain from trying 
to prevent what is basically an equilibrium adjustment of the RER. I think that 
most  analysts will agree with the general thrust of  these recommendations; 
however, I also believe that they are extremely difficult to follow through: first, 
because in some cases both factors are behind the observed appreciation of the 
currency; second, because it is not at all easy, even after a few months have 
passed,  to distinguish between “genuine”  and “volatile” capital inflows; and 
third, because in some cases political economy considerations have made of 
the convergence to single-digit inflation rates the primary objective of authori- 
ties who feel they have too much to lose if that goal is abandoned. This situa- 
tion is complicated further by the difficulties in assessing how much of the 
appreciation would really need to be reversed in each particular case. I do not 52  Sebastian Edwards 
have any clear-cut answer to the dilemma posed by this situation, and I’m al- 
most certain that there isn’t  one. However, I wonder whether the current cir- 
cumstances would justify considering more seriously the possibility once men- 
tioned to me by a policymaker faced with a similar dilemma: “when in doubt 
about the exchange rate, let it float; at least in that way you can always blame 
the market.” 